

Adm - 13.6

TOP SECRET

Copy ___ of ___

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT: U-2 Options, FY 1973

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. In the NRO Budget Call for FY 1973, the DNRO requested that estimates be provided by CIA and the Air Force for 4 Options concerning the assignment of responsibilities for the U-2 Fleet. On 25 May, the DDS&T requested that an alternative option be developed. The present status of the fleet, the NRO Options, the alternative Option and an OSA evaluation of the Options are summarized below.

3. At present, there [] U-2R's under the control of the DNRO. [] of these are operated by CIA, [] operated by the Air Force with a distribution as follows:

CIA: North Base Edwards (Det. "G") - []

Total


AF: Davis Monthan, Tucson, Ariz. - []
McCoy AFB, Orlando, Fla. - []

Total

The CIA aircraft are operated by contract pilots and are maintained by commercial contractors. The Air Force planes are operated and maintained by Service personnel with minor assistance from commercial contractors.

NRO review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET



DB/S&
FILE COPY

25X1

TOP SECRET

[REDACTED]
Page 2

25X1

4. All Options for which the DNRO requested estimates assumed continuation of present Air Force support to the U-2 Program. These Options were:

Option I: Retention of the split fleet. CIA and Air Force responsibility would remain unchanged.

Option II: Consolidation under the DNRO. CIA would operate Detachment "H" as at present and would retain [REDACTED] at Detachment "G". CIA would assume operational control of [REDACTED] event of its deployment. CIA funding and manpower requirements would remain substantially the same.

25X1

25X1

Option III: Consolidation of the entire fleet under CIA. Principal changes are the assumption of responsibilities for the Cuban mission and the operation and manning by CIA of a Detachment in South East Asia.

Option IV: Essentially the same as Option II, except that it provides for consolidation under the Air Force.

5. Our best estimates of the total U.S. Government's costs for the 4 Options, including CIA, NRP and Air Force costs, indicate that no option provides any real savings to the U.S. Government or to the CIA and NRP "black" budgets. Total Government cost variation between all options is

[REDACTED] Options II & IV would [REDACTED] in NRP funding, compared with Option I, but this would be offset by an increase in the Air Force budget. Option III would decrease costs to the Air Force [REDACTED] when compared with Option I, but would increase "black" budget (CIA & NRP) [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

[REDACTED]

25X1

TOP SECRET

[redacted]
Page 3

25X1

6. In consequence of the above, and in consonance with DDS&T guidance, OSA has developed a modification of Option I, referred to hereafter as Option IA. Under this Option:

- a. CIA would assume responsibility for the purely NRP U-2 operations. The principal change from the present would be CIA's assumption of responsibility for the Cuba mission. The Cuba mission would be flown from North Base Edwards with a turn-around recovery at a southeastern station. Two U-2R's now assigned to the Air Force would be transferred to CIA for positioning at Edwards.
- b. The Air Force would continue the South East Asia Detachment's [redacted] primarily a tactical military mission, and would retain 4 U-2R's for this mission.

25X1

Assignment of the primarily NRP responsibilities to CIA would permit transfer of the Air Force's South East Asia activity from the "black" budget to the "white" budget. While there would be no identifiable net savings to the Government, the transfer would permit a [redacted] in the CIA and NRP "black" budgets when compared with Options I, II/IV and III respectively. The cost to CIA of Option IA would be [redacted] compared to Option I. In comparison with Option III it would [redacted] in CIA funding [redacted]

25X1

25X1


7. In summary, Option I (Split Fleet) continues to be acceptable. Options II&IV (Consolidation under NRO or Air Force) provide no economic or operational advantages to the NRO or to CIA and are not alternatives acceptable to CIA. Option III (Consolidation under CIA) would be the most economical to the Government and the most effective alternative.

TOP SECRET

[redacted]

25X1

TOP SECRET


Page 4

25X1

However, all dollar and manpower savings would be in the Air Force's "white" budget and the CIA and NRP budgets would actually be increased. Thus, Option IA as outlined above would appear to be the preferred option as it would, on the one hand, provide a continuing rapid response, nonattributable reconnaissance capability at a nominal increase in CIA costs and, on the other hand, would permit a major reduction in the NRP "black" budget.

8. A summary of NRO and CIA costs by option and the OSA Operational Concept for Option IA are attached hereto.




25X1

Acting Director of Special Activities

Attachments:
As stated above.

TOP SECRET



25X1

TOP SECRET

Page 5

25X1

25X1 B&FD/Compt/OSA (9 June 71)
Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - DDS&T, w/att
3 - COMPT/DDS&T, w/att
4 - DDS&T Reg, wo/att
5 - DD/SA, w/att
6 - COMPT/OSA, w/att
7 - D/M/OSA, w/att
8 - D/OPS/OSA, w/att
9 - SAS/OSA, w/att
10 - C/B&FD/OSA, w/att
11 - RB/OSA, wo/att

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP74B00681R000100030003-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP74B00681R000100030003-6